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Russell’s discussion of belief in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism is brief, tentative and 
mostly negative. The standard view has been that in the Lectures, Russell no longer believed 
in the multiple relation theory of judgment but was not yet in a position to articulate an 
alternative conception of belief; that came only a little later, with the psychological account of 
belief that is found in such works as On Propositions (1919) and The Analysis of Mind 
(1921). In this paper, I challenge the standard view. First, I present evidence to support the 
claim that the views that Russell held in 1918 at least leave room for a version of the multiple 
relation theory, albeit one that would be rather different from the view he held before. Second, 
I consider some key developments in Russell’s thinking about judgment during 1913–1918. 
These developments indicate the direction in which he may have been moving. Third, I 
present some speculation – partly relying on a recent work by Fraser MacBride – regarding a 
positive account of judgment in Russell’s Lectures; an important connection that emerges 
from this speculation is one between the multiple relation theory of judgment and the 
distinction between positive and negative facts. 
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1. Russell’s discussion of the nature of judgment in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, 
Lecture IV, is brief and, on the face of it, rather tentative.2 Russell himself acknowledges this, 
as when he apologizes to his audience for “pointing out difficulties rather than laying down 
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quite clear solutions” (Russell 1918a: 199). Here, as in most of the Lectures, Russell is 
concerned with the discovery of the logical form of a certain range of facts. In this case, these 
are the facts expressed by propositional verbs, such as “believing”, “doubting”, “wishing”, 
and so on.3 The analysis of such facts – facts containing two or more verbs (“Othello believes 
that Desdemona loves Cassio”) will introduce a new logical form, one that is distinct from the 
form of atomic facts, or facts containing just one verb.4 Their analysis also presents fresh 
difficulties distinct from those involved in the analysis of molecular propositions. 
Russell gave his Lectures just before he set out to think hard about a complex set of 
issues relating to neutral monism and its acceptability: the nature of presentation (awareness) 
and the elimination of what Russell sometimes called the “pin-point Subject”,5 the nature of 
belief and the problem of error, and the nature of demonstrative reference or “emphatic 
particulars”, as Russell called them. Two passages by later Russell himself comment on this 
development: 
 
It was in 1918 […] that I first became interested in the definition of ‘meaning’ and in 
the relation of language to fact. Until then I had regarded language as ‘transparent’ and 
had never examined what makes its relation to the non-linguistic world. (1959: 145) 
 
The problem of meaning is one which seems to me to have been unduly neglected by 
logicians; it was this problem which first led me, about twenty years ago, to abandon the 
anti-psychological opinion in which I had previously believed. (1938: 362) 
 
Russell had been occupied by neutral monism already before the Great War.6 But as these two 
later comments indicate, he now set out to tackle his problems from a new perspective that 
introduced “meaning” and psychology.7 The change of perspective is anticipated already in 
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PLA. Consider for example the term “proposition”, which points in two directions. On the one 
hand, Russell continues to hold that propositions are nothing (1918a: 196); and if you 
introduce propositions as objects of attitudes, you may keep that provided you remember that 
it is not the truth and that in reality “you have to analyze up the proposition and treat your 
belief differently” (1918a: 197). On the other hand, he also holds that for the purposes of the 
sort of logical discussion that is the concern of the Lectures, “it is natural to concentrate upon 
the proposition as the thing that is going to be our typical vehicle on the duality of truth and 
falsehood” (1918a: 165). A proposition, understood in this way, is just a complex symbol 
(1918a: 166); it is a piece of language, a sentence in the indicative mood or maybe a sentence-
nominalization. Russell holds, furthermore, that facts are truth- and falsehood-makers for 
propositions (1918a: 163), so that once we concentrate on the proposition as the truth-value 
bearer, we are thereby focusing, precisely, on the “relation of language to fact”. 
Still further, Russell has this to say about propositions qua symbols: 
 
When I speak of a symbol I simply mean something that “means” something else, and 
as to what I mean by “meaning” I am not prepared to tell you. […] I think that the 
notion of meaning is always more or less psychological, and that it is not possible to get 
a pure logical theory of meaning, nor therefore of symbolism. (1918a: 167) 
 
Here – like elsewhere in the Lectures – Russell sets psychology aside, not because it is 
irrelevant to his concerns but because he is not yet prepared to take up issues that belong to 
psychology.8 That development would indeed take place only slightly later. What is left are 
the sort of “more purely logical questions” (1918a: 196) with which he and Wittgenstein had 
been occupied before the war. 
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The discussion of belief in PLA presents Russell in transition on the problem of 
judgments. On the one hand, he continues to advocate the basic intuition behind the multiple 
relation theory of judgment (MRTJ): “The belief does not really contain a proposition as a 
constituent but only contains the constituents of the proposition as constituents” (1918a: 197). 
On the other hand, it also seems, since we know what happened  after PLA, that Russell was 
able to overcome difficulties in the analysis of belief only by re-psychologizing the 
proposition; this step is explicit in On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean 
(1919) and subsequent work, as in The Analysis of Mind (1921). 
Much of the scholarly commentary on Russell’s discussion of judgment in PLA has 
been in line with this dualism. Thus the interpretative claim has been advanced by many that 
the Russell of PLA no longer believed – or no longer really believed – in MRTJ but that he 
was not yet in a position to formulate an adequate alternative. Wittgenstein’s influence, 
moreover, is usually seen as decisive here, so much so that the complex dialectic of Russell’s 
changing views is seen exclusively through the prism of Wittgenstein’s influence on his 
former tutor, or at any rate as so many reactions on Russell’s side to points derived from 
Wittgenstein: first, it is held that it was the criticism that Wittgenstein directed at MRTJ that 
left Russell without a theory of judgment in 1913; second, this criticism is also seen as the 
decisive factor that made Russell abandon work on the Theory of Knowledge -project that 
same year; third, it is further held that the reasons which were operative in 1913 were still 
decisive in 1918. Thus, although the Russell of PLA had come to accept the core of 
Wittgenstein’s criticism, or the core of what he took to be that criticism, the lesson was still 
essentially negative in 1918: that is, Russell now knew, thanks to Wittgenstein’s influence , 
what judgment could not be, but was not yet in a position to say what it was.9 
There is no denying Wittgenstein’s influence on Russell. The textual evidence is quite 
clear on this point, as when Russell explains in the short Preface to the published versions of 
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the Lectures that they “are very largely concerned with explaining certain ideas which I learnt 
from my friend and former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein” (1918a: 160). But the evidence also 
suggests a picture of “Russell and judgment in 1918” that is more nuanced than the standard 
story. In fact, I’m inclined to go so far as to argue that in 1918, when he gave the Lectures, 
Russell did have a theory of judgment. It was still a version of the multiple relation theory, 
although in a radically new form, which was necessitated by things that he got from 
Wittgenstein.10 
 
2. There are no less than five observations suggesting that the standard story needs revision. 
First, when Russell definitively repudiated the multiple relation theory 1919, his 
explanation of why the renunciation was necessary had, on the face of it, nothing to do with 
the criticism that Wittgenstein had directed at MRTJ in 1913: 
 
The theory of belief which I formerly advocated, namely, that it consisted in a multiple 
relation of the subject to the objects constituting the “objective”, i.e. the fact that makes 
the belief true or false, is rendered impossible by the rejection of the subject. The 
constituents of the belief cannot, when the subject is rejected, be the same as the 
constituents of its “objective”. (1919a: 295)  
 
Saying that Russell’s stated reason has nothing to do with Wittgenstein’s criticism of MRTJ 
presupposes a reasoned opinion on what that criticism was. But whatever exactly it may have 
been – and there is no scholarly consensus on that point – it is reasonably clear that 
Wittgenstein was not yet concerned with the ‘rejection of the subject’ in 1913 and, 
consequently, that this could not have been the point of his criticism. 
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Wittgenstein’s rejection of the subject, or the “soul”, is only announced in the 
Tractatus. There Wittgenstein argues that the use of such forms of expression as “A believes 
that p is the case”, etc. suggests a correlation of a fact and a subject; in reality, however, the 
form is “‘p’ says p”, which is a correlation of facts by means of a correlation of their objects 
and shows that there is no soul as conceived in “superficial psychology of the present day” or 
“modern theory of knowledge”.11 On the other hand, when Wittgenstein gave a sketch of the 
form of belief-ascriptions in the Notes on Logic, the emphasis was on the bipolarity of 
propositions – a feature that Russell had failed to appreciate, according to Wittgenstein – and 
not on the elimination of the subject. Rather than eliminating the subject, Wittgenstein in fact 
presupposes it, as when he argues that in order correctly to analyze “A believes p”, we have to 
make A stand in a relation to the two poles, a and b, of the proposition a-p-b (Wittgenstein 
1913: 97).12 
Second, when we look at what Russell actually says in PLA, we see him continuing to 
advocate MRTJ; or at least we see him continuing to accept its basic underlying idea. This is 
one of the two key points on judgment that he wants to get through to his audience: 
 
There really are two main things that one wants to notice in this matter that I am treating 
of just now. The first is the impossibility of treating the proposition believed as an 
independent entity, entering as a unit into the occurrence of a belief [….] (1918a: 199; 
italics added) 
 
Third, Russell not only acknowledge Wittgenstein’s influence on him on the topic of 
judgment but was quite emphatic on the point. But what he says indicates that what he 





[A]nd the other is the impossibility of putting the subordinate verb on a level with its 
terms as an object term in the belief. That is a point in which I think that the theory of 
judgment which I set forth once in print some years ago was a little unduly simple, 
because I did then treat the object verb as if one could put it as just an object like the 
terms, as if one could put “loves” on a level with Desdemona and Cassio as a term for 
the relation “believe”. (1918a: 199; italics added) 
 
Russell makes the same point in another context. In “Knowledge by Acquaintance and 
Knowledge by Description”, a paper originally published in 1911, he had explained that if I 
judge, for example, that A loves B, the judgment is an event consisting of a specific four-
term-relation of judging between me and A and love and B, with judging occurring as a 
“relating relation”. This is the familiar MRTJ. When the 1911-essay was reprinted in 1917 in 
Mysticism and Logic, Russell appended the following footnote to the explanation: “I have 
been persuaded by Mr. Wittgenstein that this theory is somewhat unduly simple […]” (1911: 
154). Putting these two passages together, we see that Russell’s second main thing – that the 
‘subordinate verb’ cannot be put as an object term in a belief complex – came from 
Wittgenstein; but we also see that the modification has to do with a point on which Russell 
says his old theory had been somewhat too simple. Admittedly, one may regard this as an 
“understatement” on Russell’s part; but the point remains that what is needed is presented as a 
modification of MRTJ.13 
The fourth observation relates to what Russell wrote in 1959 about why he did 




In my belief [that Socrates loves Plato], the unity of the complex depends upon the 
relating relation believing, where love does not enter as a relating relation, but as one of 
the terms between which the relation of believing holds. […] I abandoned this theory, 
both because I ceased to believe in the ‘subject’, and because I no longer thought that a 
relation can occur significantly as a term, except when a paraphrase is possible in which 
it does not so occur. (1959: 182) 
 
If we follow up on this comment, we should conclude that one of the two reasons for 
renouncing MRTJ (the ‘Wittgenstein reason’, having to do with how a relation occurs in a 
fact) was in place in the Lectures, while the other reason, having to do with discarding the 
“pin-point Subject”, came slightly later: the second reason is asserted in On Propositions but 
is absent from the Lectures. If we take the latter reason to have been decisive – as is 
suggested, I think, by the comment in Russell (1919a) that was quoted above – then there 
remains the possibility that PLA does leave room for a version of MRTJ, albeit one that 
differs from the earlier one on a crucial point; how crucial the point is, is something that I 
shall consider below. 
The fifth and final observation concerns a further point about the passage from On 
Propositions with which we began. Consider carefully how the passage describes MRTJ: 
MRTJ is the theory that belief consists “in a multiple relation of the subject to the objects 
constituting the ‘objective’, i.e. the fact that makes the belief true or false”. Now, this is 
clearly different from MRTJ as found in Philosophical Essays, the Introduction to Principia, 
The Problems of Philosophy or Theory of Knowledge. On each of these earlier versions of the 
theory, a judgment is said to be true when there is a complex corresponding to the judgment 
and false when there is no such corresponding complex: truth is aligned with the existence 
and falsehood with non-existence of “complexes” or “facts”. For example, Othello’s belief 
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that Desdemona loves Cassio is false because there is no complex unity appropriately 
compounded of Desdemona, loving and Cassio and corresponding to Othello’s belief (Russell 
1912: 75). In PLA, on the other hand, Russell embraced positive and negative facts as truth- 
and false-makers for positive and negative atomic propositions. On this view, an atomic 
proposition “d has the relation L to c”, if false, is false because it is made false by the negative 
fact that d does not have the relation L to c. This is one well-known and much discussed 
doctrine in the Lectures. But the passage from On Propositions suggests that at one time 
Russell entertained a plan of combining a new version of MRTJ with the distinction between 
positive and negative facts. This is the idea that I shall explore in this paper. 
 
3. In PLA, the discussion of judgment centers on the “puzzle about the nature of belief” that 
Russell explains in Section 3 of Lecture IV. The puzzle is inextricably intertwined with the 
discovery, which Russell attributes to Wittgenstein, that we cannot make “a map-in-space of a 
belief” (1918a: 198–9) and that, therefore, belief-facts introduce a completely new species 
into the inventory of logical forms of facts. Here is the key passage: 
 
The point is in connection with there being two verbs in the judgment and with the fact 
that both verbs have got to occur as verbs, because if a thing is a verb it cannot occur 
otherwise than as a verb. Suppose I take “A believes that B loves C.” “Othello believes 
that Desdemona loves Cassio.” There you have a false belief. You have this odd state of 
affairs that the verb “loves” occurs in that proposition and seems to occur as relating 
Desdemona to Cassio whereas in fact it does not do so, but yet it does occur as a verb, it 
does occur in the sort of way that a verb should do. I mean that when A believes that B 
loves C, you have to have a verb in the place where “loves” occurs. You cannot put a 
substantive in its place. Therefore it is clear that the subordinate verb (i.e. the verb other 
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than believing) is functioning as a verb, and seems to be relating two terms, but as a 
matter of fact does not when the judgment happens to be false. That is what constitutes 
the puzzle about the nature of belief. (1918a: 198; italics added) 
 
Russell’s description of the puzzle is not very helpful, even granting that what he is trying to 
convey to his audience is his own perplexity. Describing the “odd state of affairs”, he speaks 
of a verb occurring “in that proposition”. But which proposition is that? He has just argued in 
the previous section that the correct analysis of belief does not mention propositions in his old 
sense. Nor is he talking about linguistic propositions here. But then again we cannot simply 
substitute “judgment” for “proposition”, thinking that Russell is being careless here. For it is 
far from clear that the verb – relation, that is – “loves” occurs in Othello’s judgment that 
Desdemona loves Cassio, or that it even seems to occur in that judgment as relating her to 
him.  
Of course, we do know why Russell was perplexed about belief in PLA. We know this 
because we know the context in which the perplexity arose. It is this context that we need to 
consider to see not only what the puzzle was but also whether Russell had something 
constructive to say about the topic of judgment at the time when he gave the Lectures. What is 
clear enough is that the puzzle about the nature of belief and Wittgenstein’s logical discovery 
about the logical form of belief-facts relate to Russell’s old theory of judgment, the one that 
he now perceived as “a little unduly simple”. The Lectures do contain further material that is 
relevant here. It is found in the discussion of understanding at the beginning of Lecture III 
(1918a: 181–3); there, as in the discussion of the puzzle, Wittgenstein is mentioned explicitly 
as the source of important new ideas. Beyond the Lectures, further elucidation may be 
obtained from considering where Russell stood vis-à-vis Wittgenstein and the topic of 
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judgment in 1914, immediately after the event of Wittgenstein’s criticism of MRTJ, which 
allegedly destroyed that theory. 
 
4. What underlies the puzzle about the nature of belief is Wittgenstein’s notorious nonsense 
objection to MRTJ.14 Wittgenstein had argued in Notes on Logic that the propositional 
character of judging, i.e., the feature that judging is necessarily judging that so-and-so, is 
inevitably lost once judging is construed as an act which puts a multiplicity of entities in front 
of the judging mind. This is, in effect, to treat the entities with which the judgment is 
concerned as “substantives”, and then there is nothing to stop one from putting a substantive 
for a verb, and the result will be a nonsensical judgment: 
 
When we say A judges that, etc. then we have to mention a whole proposition which A 
judges. It will not do either to mention only its constituents, or its constituents and form 
but not in the proper order. This shows that a proposition itself must occur in the 
statement to the effect that it is judged. […] In “A judges (that) p”, p cannot be replaced 
by a proper name. This is apparent if we substitute “A judges that p is true and not-p is 
false”. […] Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that 
“this table penholders the book” (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this requirement). 
[…] The structure of the proposition must be recognized and then the rest is easy. 
(Wittgenstein 1913: 96) 
 
Russell was not blind to the fact that judgment is propositional or that with judgment, “the 
structure of the proposition must be recognized”. By the time he went to Harvard in the spring 
of 1914, however, he had lost his faith in the ability of the MRTJ to cope with the problem. 
Before discussing the conclusions that he had drawn by that time, it is useful to have before 
12 
 
our minds a rough chronology of Russell’s attempts to “recognize the structure of the 
proposition” (or “propositional structure”, as I shall call it) within the framework of MRTJ: 
 
1) Propositional structure derives from, or is grounded in, the sense or direction of the 
judging relation (before Theory of Knowledge); 
2) Propositional structure derives from, or is grounded in, logical form (in Theory of 
Knowledge); 
3) Propositional structure derives from, or is grounded in, neutral fact (in Russell’s 
working notes that probably date from late May of 1913); 
4) Propositional structure derives from, or is grounded in, the two verbs of a judgment 
fact; this is the two verbs solution, the negative part of which is formulated by the 
spring of 1914, and of the positive part of which there are indications in PLA. 
 
I shall not discuss the first two items on the list, except for a reminder that the reason why 
Russell introduced logical forms in Theory of Knowledge was precisely that he needed a way 
of recognizing propositional structure without invoking propositions. This is shown by the 
following passage (it is about understanding rather than judging, but it applies to the latter 
notion as well):  
 
[W]hen we are concerned with a proposition which may be false, and where, therefore, 
the actual complex is not given, we have only, as it were, the “idea” or “suggestion” of 
the terms being united in such a complex; and this, evidently, requires that the general 
form of the merely supposed complex should be given. More simply, to understand “A 
and B are similar”, we must know what is supposed to be done with A and B and 
similarity, i.e. what it is for two terms to have a relation; that is, we must understand the 
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form of the complex which must exist if the proposition is true. (Russell 1913: 116; 
italics added) 
 
Apparently, Russell lost faith in logical forms in this specific sense soon after their 
introduction. This development takes us to stage 3) in our chronology, which consists of a 
series of working notes which Russell may have composed in late May 1913: 
 
Three objects x, R, y form one or other of two complexes xRy or xRy. 
The proposition xRy points to either indifferently: both contain nothing but x and R and 
y. 
When we understand the propositions, what is happening points equally to either of 
these two complexes – at least it points to whichever there is of the two. […] 
It looks as if there actually were always a relation of x and R and y whenever they form 
either of the two complexes, and as if this were perceived in understanding. If there is 
such neutral fact, it ought to be a constituent of the positive or negative fact. It will 
provide a meaning for possibility. […] 
 
(1) Call the positive fact (xRy), and the negative fact (xRy). 
(2) Call the neutral fact (xRy), and the proposition xRy. 
(3) Call the judgment J{(xRy)} or J{(xRy)} or J{(xRy)} 
No, this won’t do; it must be  J(xRy),  J(xRy),  J(xRy). Otherwise we should have 
to know before judging. 
 
Judgment involves the neutral fact, not the positive or negative fact. 
The neutral fact has a relation to a positive fact, or to a negative fact. 
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Judgment asserts one of these. It will still be a multiple relation, but its terms will not be 
the same as in my old theory. The neutral fact replaces the form. 
Call neutral fact “positively directed” when it corresponds to a positive fact, 
“negatively directed” when it corresponds to a negative fact. […] 
There will only be a neutral fact when the objects are of the right types. This 
introduces great difficulties (Russell 1913: 195–9; all italics in the original) 
 
Several important points emerge from a reflection on these notes. First, they introduce the 
notion of “neutral fact”. Talk of the form as being replaced by the neutral fact indicates that 
Russell conceived the idea after rejecting logical forms; or at least that he conceived it as a 
response to whatever criticisms Wittgenstein directed against Russell’s theory of judgment at 
the time.15 They suggest, furthermore, that “neutral fact” was introduced for the same purpose 
as logical form, that is, to capture the propositionality of judgment.  
Second, the notes also introduce the distinction between positive and negative facts ( -
facts). These two innovations, neutral facts and  -facts, are clearly meant as complementary 
notions. The idea here, I venture to guess, is to use “neutral fact” to make sense of the 
propositionality of judgment (“Judgment involves neutral fact”), and to use “ -facts” to find 
worldly correlates for judgments (“Judgment asserts one of these”). Being neutral, neutral 
facts fall short of being positive or negative, and hence fall short of being fully actual, as it 
were; hence they may occur as constituents in judgments as well in  -facts. Being facts, 
neutral facts are presumably unities. One thing where this might help is in securing the 
propositionality of judgment and in circumventing Wittgenstein’s nonsense objection. But 
Russell senses difficulties here, witness the final note in the quotation: for there to be a neutral 
fact, its constituents must be “of the right types”, and this “introduces great difficulties”.  
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Third, Russell continues to assert that judgment is a multiple relation. Unfortunately, he 
does not tell what its terms are supposed to be, and it is easy to see that the working notes are 
quite unclear on this point. On the one hand, Russell’s symbolism, as exemplified by 
“J(xRy)”, suggests that judgment is in fact a binary rather than a multiple relation, as it 
seems to indicate that judgments operate on something like propositional contents or maybe 
states of affairs after the manner of the Tractatus.16 Such entities, however, would be 
excluded by general Russellian principles. On the other hand, that symbolism is inconsistent 
with Russell’s explanation of judgment as involving a neutral fact standing in a relation to a 
positive or negative fact. And there is the further point, also noticed by Carey (2003: 38), that 
“subject” is nowhere mentioned in the working notes. For these reasons, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to make anything definitive of these notes on this point. 
The notion of a neutral fact, as sketched in Russell’s notes, may be a non-starter.17 What 
does emerge from the notes, however, is the important new idea that judgment as a multiple 
relation might be combined with the theoretical innovation of  -facts. 
  
5. The next step in our chronology takes us to the early 1914 and Harvard, where Russell 
lectured on logic (with Harry T. Costello as a teaching assistant) and theory of knowledge. 
Lectures notes by T. S. Eliot and Victor F. Lenzen suggest that, by that time, Russell had 
come to accept Wittgenstein’s criticism of MRTJ as definitive. 






T. S. Eliot’s note of Russell’s course on Advanced Logic, Lecture 26, April 9, 1914; 
edited by Bernard Linsky  
 
Here we see Russell’s formulation of the nonsense objection: if you treat the subordinate 
relation as a thing, you can substitute another thing for it, “and if you do, the judgment is 
meaningless”. The phrase “My old theory of judgment” here clearly refers to published 
versions of MRTJ, primarily to the explanation in Chapter 12 of The Problems of Philosophy. 
Judgment is there explained to be a relation which has a “sense” or “direction”. When a 
subject (S) judges, it puts the objects (x, R, and y) in a certain order; here R, too, is “a brick in 
the structure, not the cement” (1912: 74), and hence it is treated as a thing or a substantive, a 
feature that gives rise to Wittgenstein’s objection. 
Arguably and plausibly, Russell spend at least a part of that day’s lecture explaining 
views from Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic. As Bernard Linsky’s contribution the present 
volume shows,19 Russell’s next lecture on Advanced Logic, on April 11th, was clearly 
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concerned with points from the Notes; so Russell may well have explained the nonsense 
objection against MRTJ in the course of discussing Wittgenstein’s views.20 It seems, 
moreover, that the nonsense or meaninglessness objection was not just a report on 
Wittgenstein’s theory. The quotation from Eliot’s note includes the claim that propositions 
“are in some sense incomplete symbols”, and this does not fit Wittgenstein’s views but, 
rather, fits the multiple-relation theory. In the Notes on Logic, Wittgenstein argues that neither 
the “sense” nor the “meaning” of a proposition is a thing; these words are incomplete symbols 
(1913: 94). On the other hand, Wittgenstein clearly thinks that a proposition is a complete 
symbol, as when he argues that “a proposition itself must occur in the statement to the effect 
that it is judged”, as in the quotation in Section 4 above. So I take it that Russell was 
explaining what he himself had come think about his “old theory of judgment”. 
This is in line with what is found in another document relating to Russell’s teaching at 
Harvard 1914: Victor F. Lenzen’s notes on Russell’s lectures on Theory of Knowledge.21 
They are also a little more informative of where Russell stood vis-à-vis the topic of judgment 
at that time. The following reproduces sheet [58] of Lenzen’s notes: 
 
Sheet [58] of Notes that Victor F. Lenzen took of Russell’s seminar on Theory of Knowledge  
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at Harvard 1914; edited by Bernard Linsky. 
 
Here we see Russell making points that are familiar from PLA. First, in a belief-fact with two 
verbs, both verbs must occur as verbs; pace Russell’s old theory of judgment, the subordinate 
verb really is a verb and not a substantive. Second, a belief-fact is nevertheless a single fact, 
and not two facts. Third, there is Russell’s standard argument that the possibility of error 
shows that judgment cannot be a dual relation; we do not simply say, “I believe a 
proposition”. Together these points constitute an “oddity of propositional thought”: the logical 
form of a belief-fact is “peculiar”, because two verbs come in.  
We see, then, that by the spring of 1914, Russell has drawn the conclusions that many 
interpreters see as an impasse: he has derived from Wittgenstein the lesson about verbs 
occurring as verbs; nevertheless, he continues to affirm the basic idea of MRTJ. 
 
6. The chronology above mentions the “two verbs solution” to the problem of recognizing 
propositional structure. But so far we have only seen the negative side of the matter, the 
“puzzle about the nature of belief”, or “oddity of propositional thought”, which was in place 
already in 1914. To make a case for the constructive side, we must enter the realm of 
speculation. This speculation, though, is not without textual evidence. Some of the 
speculation makes use of MacBride (2013), an important recent essay on the Russell-
Wittgenstein schism. I then add a further speculative layer to MacBride’s reading of Russell’s 
1918 view of judgment.  
MacBride is more optimistic than most commentators about the prospects of finding in 
PLA a constructive notion of judgment under the general heading of “multiple relation 
theory”. As MacBride himself plausibly puts it, it “seems an unlikely hypothesis that 
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Russell’s continued championing of the multiple relation theory during this period was merely 
a consequence of intellectual inertia” (2013: 232).  
Prior to 1914/1918, Russell had held, as Landini (2007: 57) puts it, that “universals have 
both a predicable nature and an individual nature”. Accepting a lesson from Wittgenstein, 
however, Russell came to reject this doctrine. He now argued that predicates and relations can 
never occur except as predicates or relations, never as subjects (1918a: 182).22 Thus, on the 
face of it, Russell had come round to a view similar to Frege’s distinction between objects and 
concepts, of which the latter are unsaturated or essentially predicative. In fact, however, 
Russell’s position is rather more involved. For Russell must now recognize three kinds of 
occurrences of constituents in facts:  
 
(1) Occurrences as subjects;  
(2) Occurrences as relating relations (or as predicating predicates); 
(3) Purely predicative occurrences (occurrences “as verbs”). 
 
MacBride (2013: 234) argues that recognition of (3) is necessitated not only by the new 
version of MRTJ but also by such innovations as negative facts. Our chronology above 
suggests, though, that in Russell’s thought there was an intrinsic link between the two. We 
saw how Russell, in 1913, had the idea that neutral facts are involved in both judgments and  
-facts (although, to be sure, he failed to make full sense of this). In PLA, this dual role is taken 
over by purely predicative occurrences. Russell continues to accept negative facts, a view 
which he had defended already at Harvard.23 He says nothing directly about their structure, 
but commitment to purely predicative occurrences is nevertheless plausibly read into PLA, 
too. Firstly, there is the general observation that MacBride, too, makes: the fact that a and b 
are not related by R, if it is a fact, can hardly be compounded of a and b, actually related by R. 
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Secondly and more importantly, the 1919-essay On Propositions argues that the distinction 
between positive and negative facts is a primitive distinction between two opposing qualities, 
positive and negative (1919a: 279–280). Supposing that something like “[aRb]” is a 
reasonable schematic representation of the structure of Russellian atomic facts, this clearly 
presupposes that universals have purely predicative occurrences. And this view is plausibly 
read into PLA, too, as it is clearly Russell’s version of Wittgenstein’s idea of bipolarity.24 
Thirdly, the only way to circumvent the general observation and avoid purely predicative 
occurrences is in fact to incorporate negativity into the universal itself. Russell, however, is 
explicit in rejecting negative universals in PLA.25  
What then of MRTJ and purely predicative occurrences? MacBride makes two points 
about the matter. First, he spells out in a little more detail the conception of judgment towards 
which Russell was drawn in PLA. Predicative occurrences, MacBride (2013: 235) observes, 
were exactly what Russell needed (i) to cope with the “puzzle of how to deal with error” 
(1918a: 198), and (ii) to respond to the nonsense objection. For if an occurrence of loves in 
“Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio” is indeed purely predicative, it can occur 
where it does occur without creating an actual unity; for the same reason, the other objects of 
the subordinate complex cannot occupy the purely predicative position. The direction of 
Russell’s thought is thus clear: he now conceives of judgment as a family of multiple 
relations, each possessing its own internal structure, with higher-order argument position or 
positions reserved for the subordinate verb and lower-order argument positions reserved for 
the objects of which the relation is predicated. 
So far, this adds little by way of a positive construction to the “puzzle about the nature 
of belief”. It is therefore useful that MacBride (2013: 235) adds a further “speculative 
flourish”. He now refers to Arthur Prior’s discussion of the conception of judgment that 
Ramsey sketched in the 1920s, and suggests that “what Russell may have been tentatively 
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edging towards” in PLA is an appreciation of a far more radical version of [MRTJ] than 
hitherto countenanced”. 
MacBride notes how Prior distances himself from MRTJ (Prior 1967: 229). Elaborated, 
the criticism may be formulated as follows, using Prior’s example of Othello’s belief that 
Desdemona is unfaithful.26 The old version of MRTJ is a theory which dispenses with 
objective falsehoods (“Desdemona’s infidelity”) and with propositions (“that Desdemona is 
unfaithful”). It does this by rephrasing “Othello believes that Desdemona is unfaithful” as 
“Othello ascribes unfaithfulness to Desdemona”; the belief-fact is thus not about any complex 
entity at all but is about two real entities, Desdemona and infidelity, to which Othello stands 
“in the complex relation of ascribing the latter to the former” (1971: 8). Prior objects to this, 
pointing out that MRTJ, although rightly dispensing with ‘Desdemona’s unfaithfulness’ (and 
also with ‘that Desdemona is unfaithful’), still asks us to believe that there is such an entity as 
infidelity (universal) and such an entity as her fidelity (a fact), which makes Othello’s belief 
false – Prior’s example involves a negative universal, which Russell would not have approved 
of, but the complication is immaterial here. But propositions and facts, Prior argues, are not 
the only logical constructions or incomplete symbols that must be paraphrased away (1971: 
9). He argues that, given the identity:  
 
Othello ascribes infidelity to Desdemona = Othello believes that Desdemona is 
unfaithful, 
 
we must regard the right-hand side of the identity as explanatorily more basic because what 
needs to be explained (away) is precisely the apparent reference to an abstract object, a 
universal. Hence MRTJ stands condemned, according to Prior.27 
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But if propositions are “logical constructions”, as Prior thinks they are, then the right-
hand side, too, will have to be detailed accordingly (cf. Prior 1971: Chapter 2.2). To this end, 
he eliminates the apparent name “that Desdemona is unfaithful” by parsing “Othello believes 
that Desdemona is unfaithful” as “Othello believes that/Desdemona is unfaithful”. Understood 
in this way, the sentence is not even apparently about a proposition but is about Othello and 
Desdemona. And to appreciate the way the statement is about them, we note that although ‘ 
thinks that ’ is not itself a predicate, it does occur as a part of the predicate ‘ thinks that  is 
unfaithful’, which expresses a compound relation that might hold between Othello and 
Desdemona and is said by our sentence to hold between them. 
As MacBride (2013: 235 fn. 1) notes, it is not really much of a stretch to hold that 
Russell’s new direction of thought in PLA in fact sails very close to Prior’s own constructive 
suggestion regarding the semantics of belief attributions; seeing judgment as involving a 
compound multiple relation helps us to make sense of how ‘relating relation’ and ‘purely 
predicative occurrences’ could be reconciled with each other by incorporating the latter into 
the former. 
This is in fact the conclusion that Ramsey drew in 1927, although he did not claim to 
find it in Russell but presented it as an elaboration of what Russell had at one time held about 
judgment. Ramsey adds the comment that “it is desirable that we should try to find out more 
about” judgment construed as a compound multiple relation, and judgment “varies when the 
form of the proposition believed is varied” (1927: 157).  
 
7. In the previous section, I argued that in Russell’s mind-setting, there was an intrinsic 
connection between the new MRTJ and the distinction between positive and negative facts. In 
this section, I give a brief elaboration of what was involved in that connection.  
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At the beginning of Lecture III of PLA, Russell explains how understanding and 
acquaintance for names and particulars differ from understanding and acquaintance for 
predicates and universals. Here is the relevant passage: 
 
To understand a name you must be acquainted with the particular of which it is a name, 
and you must know that it is the name of that particular. You do not, that is to say, have 
any suggestion of the form of a proposition, whereas in understanding a predicate you 
do. To understand “red”, for instance, is to understand what is meant by saying that a 
thing is red. You have to bring in the form of a proposition. You do not have to know, 
concerning any particular “this”, that “This is red” but you have to know what is the 
meaning of saying that anything is red. You have to understand what one would call 
“being red”. The importance of that is in connection with the theory of types […]. It is 
in the fact that a predicate can never occur except as a predicate. When it seems to occur 
as a subject, the phrase wants amplifying and explaining, unless, of course, you are 
talking about the word itself. […] When you understand “red” it means that you 
understand propositions of the form “x is red”. So that the understanding of a predicate 
is something a little more complicated than the understanding of a name, just because of 
that. Exactly the same applies to relations. (1918a: 182; italics added) 
 
Understanding predicates and relations, Russell now argues, differs in an important respect 
from understanding names: hence, acquaintance with a universal must also differ from 
acquaintance with a particular. And the difference is that understanding a predicate involves 
understanding the form of a position, while understanding a name does not. Russell notes, 
moreover, that this is an important point because it connects with the issue of different kinds 
of occurrences.  
24 
 
This account contrasts with what Russell held in Theory of Knowledge regarding logical 
forms. There he explained – as was noted in section 4 above – that to understand “A and B are 
similar”, we must understand “what is to be done with A and B and similarity” and that this 
introduces the form of dual complexes (expressed by “something stands in some relation to 
something”). From the standpoint of PLA, this is wrong, because it fails to register the 
peculiar logical form of predicates. Suppose that S understands “A is red”. This is now not to 
be understood as 
 
U(S, a, redness, (x)), 
 
where (x) is the logical form of all subject-predicate complexes (cf. Russell 1913: 113). 
Russell now holds that understanding must take the following form: 
 
U(S, a,  is red). 
 
This is somewhat misleading of what Russell intends, because it might be taken to suggest 
that understanding involves a relation between a subject and an entity. What the new construal 
intends, however, is the following. First, there is no such thing as redness. Second, the 
predicate ‘red’ is not understood through acquaintance with an abstract universal but by 
understanding what is said when a thing is said to be red; that is, we understand ‘red’ when 
we understand how things are said to be when a thing is said to be red.28  
Understanding a predicate thus presupposes understanding a propositional form, 
according to Russell. But now the question arises: What is a propositional form? After all, 
Russell continues to be committed to MRTJ, and hence there aren’t any propositions. What 
25 
 
there are, or what there could be, though, are forms of facts. But what are forms of facts? How 
can there be a form of a fact if there is no facts of that form? 
Russell’s conception of fact is one on which this is a legitimate and pressing question: a 
fact is an actuality, and there are no merely possible facts.29 The following response is 
available to Russell, however. Whether a proposition (an atomic proposition) is true or false, 
there is the positive or negative fact which makes the proposition true or makes it false. And 
these facts have, or can be said to have forms.30 So I suggest that Russell’s new direction of 
thought – the speculative version of MRTJ that has been outlined here – in fact requires there 
to be positive and negative facts. Thus, Russell was committed, to the following line of 
thought to Russell: 
 
First step: Understanding words for universals presupposes acquaintance with 
propositional forms; better, involves understanding propositional forms 
Second step: But there aren’t any propositional forms, because there aren’t any 
propositions. 
Third step: But there are facts. 
Fourth step: So, there could be forms of facts, rather than forms of propositions. 
Fifth step: But what is a form of a fact, if there aren’t any facts of that form? 
Sixth step: This question is answered by introducing positive and negative facts 
corresponding to atomic propositions; there is a fact corresponding to an atomic 
proposition whether that proposition is true or false. 
Seventh step: So, the assumption of positive and negative facts guarantees that there 
will be “sufficiently many” forms of facts. 
Eight Step: MRTJ, as conceived in Russell’s Lectures on logical atomism, requires 




If this is along the right lines, it is inaccurate to say, as was said above, that when one 
understands a predicate, one understands how things are said to be using that predicate. 
Rather, what the new version of MRTJ really involves is Russell’s elaboration of the 
understanding-bipolarity connection that Wittgenstein had affirmed in 1913: to understand a 
predicate is to understand a sentence featuring that predicate, and this in turns means: to know 
what is the case if the sentence is true and to know what is the case if the sentence is false (cf. 
Wittgenstein 1913: 93–4).  
We may conclude, further, that Russell was indeed describing a fresh version of MRTJ, 
when he wrote, in On Propositions, about the theory of belief which he formerly advocated 
and according to which a belief consists “in a multiple relation of the subject to the objects 
constituting the ‘objective’, i.e. the fact that makes the belief true or false”. That version, so I 
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1 I am grateful to participants in the Centenary Celebration of Russell’s Lectures for 
comments and lively discussions. Research for this paper was supported by a grant from the 
Alfred Kordelin Foundation. 
2 I will refer to the Lectures generically as PLA; references to specific passages are by year 
and page number. 
3 Russell says they might also be called “attitudes”, but he explains that he does not like the 
term, because there is at least the possibility that not all such verbs are really psychological 
(1918a: 199). 
4 Russell uses “verb” ambiguously to mean either a linguistic expression, a member in a word 
class,  or (more often) what is expressed by a word in this class; cf. the discussion of atomic 
facts and particulars in (1918a: 177–8). 
5 Russell (1918b: 265, 268). 
6 Neutral monism – mostly that of William James – is discussed at length in the Theory of 
Knowledge -manuscript; see Russell (1913: Part I, Chapters II and III), which were separately 
published in Russell (1914). 
7 One of his prison-letters to his brother Frank shows Russell in the middle of this change: 
“there seems to me a lot of interesting work to be done on Facts, Judgments, and propositions. 
I had given up Logic years ago in despair of finding out anything more about it but now begin 
to see new hope. Approaching the old questions from a radically new point of view, as I have 
been doing lately, makes new ideas possible” (letter to Frank Russell, dated July 1, 1918; 
quoted in Russell 1986: 248–249). 
8 Russell makes the same point in Lecture IV in his brief criticism of the neutral monist theory 
of belief, which dispenses with belief as an isolated phenomenon and substitutes for it a 
behavioristic account of propositional attitudes on which the “logical essence” of an 
attitudinal fact does not involve propositional reference but a causal chain linking a bodily 
behavior to a suitable external object (1918a: 195–6). To resolve the dispute, Russell argues, 
one would have to plunge deep into psychology, which he is not willing to do. 
9 A very clear formulation of the standard story is found, for example, in Candlish (2007: 
Chapter 3). 
10 MacBride (2013) has recently advanced a similar view; I will consider some elements of 
MacBride’s interpretation below, in section 6. 
11 Wittgenstein (1922: 5.541–5.5422). 
12 The manuscript notes that Russell composed in 1918 after PLA strongly suggest that the 
imperative of discarding the ‘pin-point subject’ came upon him through a continued reflection 
on neutral monism, as in the following passage: “It must not be assumed that believing, 
wishing, etc. are irreducible phenomena. If this is assumed, it is very hard to avoid the pin-
point Subject, which ought to be avoided if possible. This problem, of getting rid of the pin-
point Subject, is a vital one in this topic” (Russell 1918b: 268; italics in the original). The 
topic is “Propositions”. 
13 “Understatement” is Landini’s (2011: 270) characterization of Russell’s comment on MRTJ 
in PLA. 
14 This label and my description of Wittgenstein’s objection show that I take for granted a 
simple and straightforward reading of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Russell’s theory of 
judgment. Wittgenstein’s criticism is formulated in his characteristically brusque and 
sweeping manner, which gives the conclusion but omits the underlying reasoning (Wrinch 
1919: 324–5 gives an equally uncompromising reply to the Wittgenstein-type objection to 
MRTJ, chalking it up to a “lingering belief in the unity of a proposition”). What matters here, 
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however, are not the details of Wittgenstein’s objection but Russell’s use of that objection in 
the spring of 1914 and thereafter and here the straightforward formulation is the gist of the 
matter; see section 5 below.  
 
15 Recall that in late May 1913, Russell and Wittgenstein were engaged in a rather heated 
exchange over the theory of judgment. In a well-known letter to Lady Ottoline, written on 27 
May 1913, Russell told about a meeting with Wittgenstein on the previous day: “Wittgenstein 
came to see me – we were both cross from the heat – I showed him a crucial part of what I 
have been writing. He said it was all wrong, not realizing the difficulties, that he had tried my 
view and knew it wouldn’t work” (Griffin 1992: 459). There are reasons to think that the 
“crucial parts” contained Russell’s discussion of the notion of logical form, since Russell had 
composed that part of the manuscript immediately before their meeting (for a discussion, see 
Connelly 2014). It is not implausible, then, that Russell’s working notes were a reaction to 
this incident. On the other hand, they contain ideas that are clearly reminiscent of 
Wittgenstein’s Notes on Logic (see Carey 2003b). This observation in itself fixes nothing, but 
it might be taken to suggest that Russell’s notes were composed at some later date. The matter 
deserves further investigation. 
16 The latter suggestion is made by Bonino (2008: 88). 
17 Some of the ideas that Russell sketches in the notes are significantly similar to the 
psychological theory of judgment that he worked out after PLA. With that theory, neutral facts 
make a kind of return. In the psychological theory, propositions in the fundamental sense are 
image propositions standing in the relation of objective reference to  -facts, which are truth- 
and falsehood makers; see Russell (1919a: sections 3 and 4) and Russell (1921: Lecture 13). 
Russell (1921: 272) attributes this basic idea to Wittgenstein, and in working it out, he makes 
further use of Wittgenstein’s ideas, including the twin-notions of propositions as facts and as 
pictures.  It is clear, however, that the picture theory was tailor-made to suit Wittgenstein’s 
notion of an atomic proposition, which is quite different from Russell’s. Hence, in fact, 
Russell had difficulties weaving the different ideas together into a coherent whole. Arguably, 
it is here that “neutral fact” finds room as the neutral element shared by a proposition and a  
-fact. This development, though, lies outside the scope of the present paper. 
18 Philosophy 21: Advanced Logic, Harvard University, 1914; Notes by T. S. Eliot. The 
material is kept in Harvard University Library. I’m grateful to Professor Bernard Linsky for 
access to transcribed material. Permission 
19 See Linsky (2018). 
20 In the version of Notes on Logic that Russell took to Harvard, there is the following remark: 
“A proper theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense” (Wittgenstein 
1913: 97). This claim is immediately preceded by an explanation that on Wittgenstein’s 
theory of the proposition, “p has the same meaning as not-p but opposite sense”. This latter 
point is found in Eliot’s notes on April 11th, although there Russell uses a slightly different 
terminology, “denotation” instead of “meaning”. 
21 Theory of Knowledge: Philosophy 9c, Harvard 1914; Notes by Victor F. Lenzen, edited by 
Bernard Linsky. Lenzen’s notes are kept in the Bertrand Russell Archives, and can be 
accessed through Digital Archive@McMaster University Library. 
22 One particularly appealing feature of Russell’s new doctrine of universals, also noted by 
MacBride (2013: 233), was that it promised a way out of the puzzle that F. H. Bradley had 
formulated for relational thought. Bradley’s case against the metaphysical validity of 
relational thought depends on what looks like an annoyingly simple dilemma: either a relation 
is something to its terms or else it is nothing to its terms; if it is nothing to its terms, then the 
terms are not related; but if it is something to them, then that requires a new connecting 
relation, and we have made no progress in explaining the fact of relatedness (Bradley 1893: 
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21). Thanks to his “Wittgensteinian turn”, Russell is now in a position to argue that Bradley 
was misled by grammar: “Bradley conceives a relation as something as substantial as its 
terms, and not radically different in kind”, and in so doing he has been misled by “the fact that 
the word for a relation is as substantial as the words for its terms” (1927: 201); see also 
Russell (1924: 332–338). 
23 See Russell (1918a: 187–190). 
24 Wittgenstein (1913: 93–4); cf. Russell (1921: 271–3). 
25 See Russell’s discussion of Demos and negative propositions: Russell (1918a: 187–8). 
26 For the criticism, see Prior (1971: Chapter 1.4). 
27 Prior (1971: 9) notes Russell’s change of mind in PLA from MRTJ to the two verbs view, 
but doesn’t elaborate on its implications for Russell. 
28 Since predicates live in sentences, the view that understanding a predicate is fundamentally 
different from understanding a predicate is just one facet of the deep contrast between names 
and sentences, a doctrine that Russell got from Wittgenstein; see Russell (1918a: 167–8).  
29 Russell (1919b: 8) explains that we cannot say that a false proposition “means the fact 
which would make it true if it were true, since there is no such fact”. 
30 See Russell (1919a: 279–80). 
